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Abstract: What is very often overlooked in the literature is that the Harrod’s Post-
Keynesian growth model is more to do with the problem of instability in a market 
economy which is caused by the role of expectations of the investors. The 
neoclassical model of growth due to Solow achieves stability not due to its 
assumption of smooth twice differentiable production function but assuming away the 
role of uncertainty. 
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Writing in the 1930s, Keynes thought that the prevailing world depression and 
the problem of unemployment, in a world full of wants, were caused by “a new 
disease … namely, technological unemployment” (Keynes, 1972: 325; emphasis in 
original) which means unemployment caused by the labour saving technical progress. 
Keynes, however, envisaged it as a temporary phase of maladjustment and was 
convinced that the problem would be solved within a hundred years which “…means 
that the economic problem is not – if we look into the future – the permanent problem 
of the human race.”(ibid: 326; emphasis in original). We must not forget that the 
‘economic problem’ Keynes was referring to was the struggle for subsistence, which 
“always has been hitherto the primary, most pressing problem of the human race..” 
(ibid: 327). However, to even a casual reader of The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money, the importance Keynes attached to the problem of unemployment 
should be obvious; particularly when he writes that, “(w)e need to throw away the 
second postulate of the classical doctrine and to work out the behaviour of a system in 
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which involuntary unemployment in the strict sense is possible” (Keynes, 1936: 16-
17). Later, in Chapter 22 he states that a theory on determinants of volume of 
employment “must be capable of explaining the phenomena of trade cycle” (ibid; 
313).  
Though Harrod (1937) found that Keynes’s contributions on economics 
constitute a genuine revolution in many fields the only criticism that he had of 
Keynesian economic system is that it is still static. After acknowledging the fact that 
Keynes has laid great stress on the role of anticipations in determining current 
equilibrium, he goes on to say  
 
(b)ut reference to anticipation is not enough to make a theory dynamic. For it 
is still static equilibrium which the anticipations along with other 
circumstances serve to determine; we are still seeking to ascertain what 
amounts of the various commodities and factors of production will be 
exchanged or used and what prices will obtain, so long as the conditions, 
including anticipations, remain the same. But in the dynamic theory, as I 
envisage it, one of the determinands will be the rate of growth of these 
amounts. Our question will then be, what rate of growth can continue to 
obtain, so long as the various surrounding circumstances, including the 
propensity to save remain the same? (Harrod, 1937: 86). 
 
Thus the dynamic equilibrium, as Harrod saw it, would be concerned with 
such question as “what rate of growth of certain magnitudes is consistent with the 
surrounding circumstances” (Harrod, ibid: 86). 
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Harrod’s dynamic theory has developed through a number of years (see for 
example, Harrod, 1939; 1948; 1973). In what follows we present the basic features of 
Harrod’s model of economic growth. We start from Harrod’s contribution since much 
of the subsequent literature on growth economics have Harrod’s instability problem 
(to be explained bellow) as their starting point1.  
The axiomatic basis of  Harrod’s theory, as presented in Harrod (1939: 14) are 
(i) the level of a community’s income is the most important determinant of its supply 
of saving; (ii) the rate of increase of its income is an important determinant of its 
demand for saving and (iii) that demand is equal to supply. These set of three axioms 
“consists in a marriage of the ‘accelerator principle’ and the ‘multiplier’ theory” (ibid: 
14). Thus, as Harcourt (1972: 15) puts it, Harrod’s work added “the capacity creating 
effects of investment” to Keynes’s “employment-creating aspects of investment”. We 
now turn our attention to the Harrod’s model of economic growth. 
 
The instability problems due to Harrod 
We start from, what is known in the literature as, the First Harrod Problem – 
that although steady state growth at full employment is possible in a model of 
economic growth, such a ‘Golden Age’ (Robinson, 1969: 99-100) is highly 
improbable since the constituents variables determining the actual rate of growth Ga, 
warranted rate of growth, Gw, (defined as ‘that overall rate of advance which, if 
executed, will leave entrepreneurs in a state of mind in which they will be prepared to 
carry on a similar advance’ Harrod (1948: 82)), the natural rate of growth Gn (the rate 
of growth of labour) are determined independently of each other. First Harrod 
                                                 
1 Though the literature some times refers to the Harrod-Domar problem, the problem of instability 




Problem – that although steady state growth at full employment is possible in a model 
of economic growth, such a ‘Golden Age’ (Robinson, 1969: 99-100) is highly 
improbable since the constituents variables determining the actual rate of growth Ga, 
warranted rate of growth, Gw, (defined as ‘that overall rate of advance which, if 
executed, will leave entrepreneurs in a state of mind in which they will be prepared to 
carry on a similar advance’ Harrod (1948: 82)), the natural rate of growth Gn (the rate 
of growth of labour) are determined independently of each other. The First Harrod 
Problem is the first step to what Harrod believes is the central issue in a free market 
economy; that “sooner or later we shall be faced once more with the problem of 
stagnation, and that it is this problem that economists should devote their main 
attention” (Harrod, 1948: v). This central issue known as the Second Harrod Problem 
is deviation of the actual rate of growth from the warranted rate for from being self-
correcting are cumulative in effect. As Hahn and Matthews (1969: 27) commented: 
It is important to distinguish clearly between the two quite separate obstacles 
to steady growth that were considered by Harrod in his pioneering 
contribution. (1) The warranted rate may be unequal to the natural rate. (2) 
The warranted rate may itself be unstable, even without reference to the 
natural rate. The second of these problems is the “knife-edge” properly so-
called, though the term is sometimes used confusingly to refer to the first 
problem as well. 
 
 The Second Harrod Problem arises due to the fact that planned (or ex-
ante) investment may not always be equal to actual (ex-post) saving. From an 
accounting point of view ex-post investment is always equal to ex-post saving – it is a 
tautology. However, to reach equilibrium ex-ante investment needs to be equal to ex-
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post saving. And this is the context in which the roles of uncertainty and expectation 
in an economy become vital; where the Second Harrod Problem stems from. This 
Problem states that the warranted rate of growth is fundamentally unstable in the 
sense that divergence of actual rate of growth, Ga, from the warranted rate, Gw, is not 
only not self-correcting but, left to itself, would produce even larger divergences over 
time (Harrod, 1948).  
 
 In Chapter 2 of the General Theory Keynes made the statement that the 
savings and investment decisions in an economy are made independently of each 
other and there is no connection guaranteeing savings and investment equality; and 
the investors lack the power of equating real rate of return with the marginal disutility 
of the factor of production and thereby elicit full employment. However, “(w)hat is 
missing from this chapter, and from the whole General Theory, is an explanation of 
how these two propositions interlock” (Shackle, 1967: 139). Though in his Treatise 
on Money, Keynes said that if “if investment exceed saving, the system would be 
stimulated to expand and conversely.” (Harrod, 1939: 19) he seems to have later 
abandoned any further attempt to explore the implication of the concept. According to 
Harrod, Keynes’s proposition of Treatise may still be a useful aid to thinking, “if for 
the definitions on which that proposition was based, we substitute (for investment) the 
definition of ex-ante investment” (Harrod, ibid: 19). 
Commenting on the instability problem due to Harrod Joan Robinson 
(1961:360) pointed out that: 
‘As the statement of ex ante equilibrium conditions, it (the familiar formula g 
= s/v) fails to isolate independent variables; s, the ratio of annual net saving to 
annual net income, is strongly influenced by the ratio of profits to income, 
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which in turn is strongly influenced by the ratio of annual net investment to 
the value of capital, that is, by g itself; v, the ratio of value of capital to annual 
net income, is influenced both through the prices of capital goods and through 
the choice of technique, by the ratio of profit, which is a function of s and g. 
All the formula can say is that, if growth is going on under equilibrium 
conditions at the rate g, then s/v is equal to it.’ (emphasis added). 
She went on to add: 
‘Harrod…….. did not want to throw away the General Theory and make 
savings govern investment…What he shows is that, if we write down a 
function for the inducement to invest (whether in terms of the accelerator, or 
of expected profits, of the supply of finance, or just of the animal spirits of the 
managers of firms) generating a desired rate of growth, and a set of identical 
conditions (the labour supply, the flow of new investment and so forth) 
providing a ‘natural’ or better, a physically possible rate of growth, and, 
furthermore, postulate equilibrium with full employment, we have 
overdetermined our system.’ (Robinson, 1961:360-61). 
What are the ways out of this problem of an over determined system? Robinson 
(1961) suggested three ways out; 
(i) Give up the idea of equilibrium and exhibit an economy blundering on 
from one situation to another (as happens in the history of the world we 
live in) following no simple predictable path. In other words, learn to live 
with the problem envisaged by Harrod. 
(ii) Introduce a functional connection between the desired and the possible 
growth rate so that the one determines the other 
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(iii) Give up the desired rate of growth and simply assume that actual growth 
goes on, in equilibrium conditions, with continuous full employment of 
available labour  
 
The Neo-classical Solution 
Solow (1956) is an example of the third way out of Harrodian instability 
problem suggested by Joan Robinson above. He claimed that the Harrod-Domar2 
model studied long run behaviour of the economy, which is the domain of 
neoclassical analysis (‘the land of margin’), with tools of short run analysis such as 
the multiplier, accelerator and fixed capital coefficient. He proposed a ‘model of long-
run growth which accepts all the Harrod-Domar assumptions except that of fixed 
proportions’ (Solow, 1956:66; emphasis added). In this model Solow could 
demonstrate that the steady state growth with full employment can be achieved in a 
model of economic growth, constructed using the neoclassical general equilibrium 
methodology. 
Solow (1956), however, implicitly assumed away existence of uncertainty as 
presented by equation 1 of his model, as well as his arguments leading up to the 
equation, that savings – a proportion of income, is always equal to the investment at 
every instant of time. This assumption of investment as an accommodating variable 
not that of a flexible capital-labour ratio and an exogenously given rate of growth of 
labour guaranteed long run stable equilibrium. Not surprisingly, growth in this general 
equilibrium model comes from the exogenously determined rate of growth of the 
efficiency of labour.  
                                                 




As Hahn and Matthews (1964:789-790) have pointed out, ‘In its basic form 
the neo-classical model depends on the assumption that it is always possible and 
consistent with equilibrium that investment should be undertaken of an amount equal 
to full-employment savings. The mechanism that ensures this is as a rule not 
specified.’  The rate of interest that ensures planned investment is equal to full 
employment saving is adjusted in one of the three possible interventions: (a) through 
the operation of Say’s Law, in the absence of money or when demand for money is 
interest inelastic; (b) through adjustment of the price level to influence the rate of 
interest via its effect on the real money balances or (c) through the use of appropriate 
monetary policy (Hahn and Matthews, 1964, p.790). The last of these three options is 
due to Meade (1961). The implication of this policy suggestion, due to Meade, is that 
there has to be some form of intervention by the monetary authorities to ensure the 
stability of the neoclassical models of economic growth. The implication of this last 
observation is that the neoclassical growth model can no longer be considered as a 
closed system. Otherwise, following Hahn and Matthews (1964:790), ‘The familiar 
Keynesian difficulties therefore arise….’ 
What will happen if we reintroduce the role of an independent investment 
function in a neoclassical growth model while retaining all the other assumptions of 
the model – constant returns to the scale, a smooth twice-differentiable production 
function that satisfies the Inada conditions (Inada, 1964), the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution as well as the flexible capital labour ratio? Sen (1970) did just 
that. He started with the well behaved neoclassical production function  
  1LKeY mt             (1) 
(where, Y, K and L stand for output, capital and labour respectively.) 




Y    )1(   
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  or marginal 
productivity of capital. Since r and α are given, Y and K must grow at the same 
proportional rate. Therefore Harrod’s warranted rate, Gw = s/v, turns out to be 

rsGw         (2) 
Sen (1970) then introduced an independent investment function based on an expected 
rate of growth, which is not necessarily equal to the warranted rate. A set of 
neoclassical entrepreneurs, given the expected (exponential) rate of growth of j over 
time plan to invest enough to make an expected rate of profit equal to the own rate of 
interest.  




eYr         (3) 














 1       (4) 
But from (2) 
rsG w   
So if 
rsj   (i.e., expected rate = warranted rate) actual income is equal to the 
expected income. Let the actual rate of growth is given by Gtt eYY  . Now, if 
rsj   
we have aGj   and if 
rsj   we have aGj   
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Thus, in whatever direction one might err in, one would feel that the error lies in the 
other direction causing the second Harrod problem to come back.  
Before we end this section, it will be interesting to point out that Solow 
himself was not completely unaware of the possibility that investment may not always 
be an accommodating variable. In a small section, entitled ‘Uncertainty etc.’, at the 
end of his 1956 article he wrote: 
 ‘No credible theory of investment can be built on the assumption of perfect 
foresight and arbitrage over time. There are only too many reasons why net 
investment should be at times insensitive to current changes in the real return 
to capital, at other times oversensitive. All these cobwebs and some others 
have been brushed aside throughout this essay. In the context, this is perhaps 
justifiable.’ (Solow, 1956:93-94; emphasis added).  
It would be interesting to speculate about the ‘context’ which ‘justifies’ these 
‘cobwebs’ to ‘be brushed aside’. 
 
Open System 
What makes Harrod’s post-Keynesian growth model different from Solow’s orthodox 
neoclassical growth model? We have already seen that the one crucial difference 
between them is the role of uncertainty in these models. From another perspective the 
differences between these models can be the underlying economic systems of these 
two models. As Loasby (2003: 291) observed, ‘[a]ny system consists of elements of 
connections between them … If every element is connected to every other element, 
the system (real or conceptual) exists in integral space’ and he cites general 
equilibrium models in economics as an example. Thus the neoclassical general 
equilibrium model due to Solow is an example of a closed system – in this model it is 
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not possible to incorporate uncertainty; hence uncertainty is assumed away from this 
kind of model. However, as opposed to a close system, ‘(a)n open system, ……….has 
interactions with the outside world. In the real world instances of perfect isolations are 
rare’ (Chick, 2004: 5). And this becomes only more relevant in the presence of 
uncertainty. In real world, since the elements of social life go through many changes 
and transformations over time, their interaction with it implies that the underlying 
economic system will also undergo many changes as time passes. The arguments 
presented in this paper are based upon the understanding that the economic system in 
Harrod is an open system in the sense described by Chick (2004) and Loasby (2003).  
In closed systems like the neoclassical general equilibrium model, history or 
social interactions do not matter. As Kaldor (1972) writes, ‘(t)he very notion of 
‘general equilibrium’ carries the implication that it is legitimate to assume that the 
operation of economic forces operate in an environment that is ‘imposed’ on the 
system in a sense other than being just a heritage of the past – one could almost say an 
environment which in its most significant characteristics is independent of history.’ 
(Kaldor, 1972:.1244). He then goes on to observe (in the same paragraph) that 
‘Continuous economic change on these assumptions can only be conceived as some 
kind of ‘moving equilibrium’ through the postulate of an autonomous (and 
unexplained) time rate of change in the exogenous variables of a kind that is 
consistent with ‘continuous equilibrium’ through time…’.  
One of the main objections made by Kaldor is to the underlying assumption of 
the general equilibrium analysis of the automatic equality between planned saving and 
investment. He pointed out that Keynes postulated that ‘…in one particular market, 
the market for savings, the price is not, or need not be, ‘market clearing’ (owing to 
liquidity preference), and if it is not, there is another mechanism that of the multiplier, 
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to bring about equality in that market …..But that mechanism operates by varying the 
amount of production in general. It leads to a situation that is not resource 
constrained.’ (Kaldor, 1975: 350; emphasis and parentheses in the original). Looked 
at from this point of view, the condition which is relevant for our discussion relates to 
the assumptions of the economic agents’ behaviour in the post-Keynesian and 
neoclassical growth models.  
In an open system, agents and their interactions may change and the structure 
and agency are interdependent. In closed systems, the nature of atomistic economic 
agents is treated as if constant (Chick and Dow, 2005: 366-367).  Such an assumption 
of agents’ behaviour is what guarantees equality between planned savings and 
investment. In the context of Keynesian uncertainty, however, an assumption of 
economic agents running on an ‘auto pilot’ is hard to justify. Planned saving need not 
and does not equalise with planned investment all the time. 
Going back to Joan Robinson’s suggestion (i) listed above, in the presence of 
instability which is; “[g]ive up the idea of equilibrium and exhibit an economy 
blundering on from one situation to another (as happens in the history of the world we 
live in) following no simple predictable path. This is relevant for policy making in a 
real world. As Loasby (2003: 294) has observed “[p]artial closure is necessary for any 
exploration of openness; we have to close our mind to many possibilities in order to 
pay attention to a few. However, our choice of partial closure in a real world will be 
dictated by the political economy of the time as shaped by the economy’s history. The 
economic policies which were relevant during the 1930s depression are not strictly 
relevant during the current economic downturn of a globalized world of off balance 
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